The introduction of a framework for optimal coalition formation using data envelopment analysis (DEA) methods is the focus of this paper. Simple examples illustrate how DEA is useful in formulating coalition models and deriving optimal solutions. In particular, the paper shows the relevance of the proposed framework in the context of analyzing how companies may reach decisions to acquire potential partners.
First Example
For the sake of convenience, a simple illustration will aid in introducing the topic of coalition formation and DEA. Consider three DMUs (k = 1,2,3) each using one input (x k ) to produce a single output (y k ). The inputs and outputs are homogeneous, so their sum is well defined, and Table 1 shows how the three DMUs make up the DEA technology. 
One may prove that this model has strongly disposable input and output (the first two inequalities) and exhibits constant returns to scale, that is
The maximal output that DMU k (k = 1, 2, 3) can produce is estimated as
Allowing DMU 1 and DMU 2 to form a coalition would raise the question of how much output they could jointly produce using their combined amount of input, The output would be   3  3  3  3  1  2  1  2  1  2  12  1  2  1  2  12  1 One could also make weaker comparisons in relation to observed outputs as shown above. The next section involves generalizing these ideas into multi-output multi-input technologies with k finite.
The General Case -Revenue Maximization
Let inputs N x R + ∈ , outputs M y R + ∈ , and assume there are k = 1, ... , K DMUs (or firms). The constant returns to scale technology may be modeled via DEA or activity analysis as
where , k = 1, ... , K are the intensity variables forming the convex cone of the observations (
k as the initial endowment belonging to DMU k, and assume that some of the inputs may be reallocated among the DMUs, say inputs n = 1, ... , N*. The rest are non-allocable and stay with their DMU. Note that one may have N* = N. Although here each DMU shares the same technology, generated by the data (x k ,y k ), k = 1, ... , K, the DMUs' output set may differ because they may have different initial endowments, x k (e.g.,
, k ≠ n').
In the multi-output formulation, one cannot maximize outputs, so selection of a method that allows for maximization is required. Assuming that output prices ( ) p are known, one may maximize revenue by maxi-
The maximum revenue for DMU k' is
One may estimate the revenue efficiency for DMU k as the ratio of observed revenue
Next, estimate the revenue efficiency gain DMU 1 can make by forming a coalition with, say, DMU 2. Their joint revenue, (1, 2, ) R p , is estimated as follows: 1. Each DMU has its own intensity variables, 1 2 , , 1, ... ,
2. Both DMUs face the same output prices; this case can be generalized to
3. One may reallocate the first n = 1,..., N* inputs to maximize the joint revenue.
One can compare the coalition's revenue, (1, 2, )
R p , to individual firm revenue,
(1,2, ) ( , ) ( , ) R p R y p R y p ≥ + , to determine whether a coalition is beneficial.
Evaluating the best coalition option for DMU 1 requires a comparison with all other DMUs, such as DMU 3 through K; for example, (1, 2, 3) , (1, 2, 4) , and so on. A best coalition exists with K being finite although it need not be unique.
The General Case -Distance Functions Maximization
When data on output prices are not available, one could add directional distance functions. The functions are independent of measurement units and, hence, can be aggregated. They also generalize the first example of adding (scalar) outputs.
The approach is a generalization of Johansen's (1972) industry production model (see Färe & Grosskopf, 2004) and can be viewed as an application of benefit theory due to Luenberger (1995) . First, let ( ) P x be an output set, ( ) { : } P x y x can produce y = , and , 0
, a directional vector. The directional output distance function is defined as follows:
The directional distance function measures the distance, in the direction of from y to the boundary of the output set; and is a generalization of Shephard's (1970) 
where the relation between the distance functions, for g = y , is given by
One may estimate the directional output distance function using the DEA or activity analysis formulation of the output set ( )
Next, use a distance function criterion to evaluate the benefits of forming a coalition. Paralleling the revenue maximization case, one may calculate the joint directional distance function in the event that DMU 1 and DMU 2 form a coalition as follows: 
Second Example
The second example relates to a case involving strategic choices of companies. In particular, the proposed framework is useful in analyzing how companies may reach decisions to acquire potential partners. Because companies experience increasing difficulty in achieving and sustaining growth, often they resort to forming strategic alliances (e.g., airlines) or acquiring other companies (e.g., the massive waves of mergers and acquisitions activity in the late 1990s). A hypothetical case involving three banks will aid in investigating the issue further. Assume that the banks use two inputs, (personnel) and (capital), to produce a single output, (loans and other investments), as evident in Table 2 . The next question is with which of the other two banks, B or C, Bank A should form a partnership. In this case, allow both inputs to be reallocated. Before committing to a strategy, Bank A must assess the amount of redundant resources that will be a burden should it decide to team up with either Bank B or Bank C. The bank could use surplus resources to achieve economies of scale or alternatively cut costs by eliminating those resources (Dyer, Kale, & Singh, 2004) .
To answer the question, one needs to solve two linear programming problems: LP Problem 1:
